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NOTES
HELPING EMPLOYERS HELP THEMSELVES:
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT AND TITLE
VII
Meredith J. Fried'
INTRODUCTION
A small business owner was shocked to hear the judgment against
him in the sexual harassment case brought by a former employee.
Because he had not conducted an adequate investigation into the
plaintiff's harassment complaint, the employer was held liable for
plaintiff's damages arising from the harassment. Determined to
protect his employees and avoid liability in the future, the employer
asked his attorney to help him conduct adequate and independent
investigations. The attorney, who until recently was a staff attorney at
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), gave him some discouraging
news. According to the FTC, correcting the flaws in his investigations
may allow the employer to avoid sexual harassment liability to the
harassed employee, but instead make him liable to the alleged
harasser for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA" or
"Act").
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits an employer
from discriminating against an employee based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.2 Sexual harassment is a form of
prohibited workplace discrimination.3 Employers may be liable for
the actions of the harasser if they fail to exercise their duty of
* The author would like to thank her family John, Gloria and Mathew Fried for their
unconditional love and unflagging support. Most of this Note, and the reasoning
contained therein, predates the House Subcommittee Hearings of May 4, 2000 on the
conflict between the FRCA and workplace investigations. The discussions and
resultant bills from those Hearings have been incorporated into the Note.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
2. Title VII states that it is "an unlawful employment practice for an
employer.., to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
3. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,73 (1986).
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reasonable care to prevent or correct harassment.4 Congress enacted
the FCRA to protect individuals from being denied credit, insurance,
or employment opportunities due to inaccurate, obsolete, or disputed
information collected or disseminated by credit bureaus or
investigators. 5
In April 1999, an FTC staff attorney issued an unofficial
interpretation of the FCRA opining that employers who use law firms
or other investigative agencies ("outside agencies") to conduct sexual
harassment investigations are subject to the requirements of the
FCRA.6 In March 2000, the FTC officially adopted this staff attorney
interpretation of the FCRA, creating a conflict between the consumer
protections of the FCRA and employer obligations with respect to
Title VII investigations.7 An employer who relies on an outside
agency to conduct a sexual harassment investigation must comply with
FCRA consumer protections, the purpose of which is to protect the
subject of an investigation from arbitrary or unfair treatment.8 To
4. See discussion infra at Part I.A.1. Heightened awareness of sexual
harassment, due in part to the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and the Paula
Jones sexual harassment suit, in addition to the availability of compensatory and
punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, has increased the number of
sexual harassment claims and the average awards levied against employers found
liable in court. See Francis Achampong, Workplace Sexual Harassment Law 157
(1999). In 1991, 6,892 sexual harassment suits were filed, with the number almost
doubling to 12,537 in 1993. In 1998, there were an estimated 18,000 such suits. See id.
5. See Alexander Hamilton Institute, Privacy in the Workplace: When
Employer-Employee Rights Collide 10 (1987) (indicating that the FCRA is
implicated when an employer investigates improper employee activity). See generally
Philip H. Myers, Annotation, Construction and Application of Fair Credit Reporting
Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.), 17 A.L.R. Fed. 675, 678 (1973 & 1999 Supp.) Myers
states that:
[I]t is the purpose of the [FCRA] to require that consumer reporting
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of
commerce ... in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with
regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of
such information in accordance with the requirements of the Act.
Id. at 678.
6. See Letter from Christopher W. Keller, Attorney, Federal Trade Commission,
Division of Financial Practices, to Judi A. Vail, Attorney (Apr. 5, 1999) (visited Nov.
17, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/vail.htm> [hereinafter Keller Letter].
The Keller Letter is an informal staff opinion and not an official FTC interpretation of
the FCRA. The FTC provides the public with a method to receive staff assistance
and "industry counseling." 16 C.FR. § 1.72 (1999). The public may send inquires to
the FrC and staff attorneys will interpret the statute and its application. See id. Such
interpretations "represent informal staff opinion which is advisory in nature and not
binding upon the Commission as to any action it may take in the matter." Id. While
the FTC is the administrative agency primarily responsible for the enforcement of the
FCRA, the FTC does not have substantive rulemaking authority under the FCRA.
Therefore, staff opinions are advisory in nature. See Note, The Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 56 Minn. L. Rev. 819, 826 (1972) [hereinafter Fair Credit Note].
7. See Letter from Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, to
Representative Pete Sessions, United States House of Representatives (Mar. 31,
2000) [hereinafter FTC Letter].
8. See Keller Letter, supra note 6.
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comply with the FCRA in the context of this type of investigation, an
employer must (1) get permission to initiate an investigation from the
employee accused of harassment and (2) disclose to that individual
any investigative report prepared by the outside agency. A conflict
arises, however, if an employer fulfills these notice and disclosure
requirements for the protection of the harasser, as he may violate the
duty of reasonable care, owed to the harassed.'
This Note examines the conflict between the FTC's interpretation
of the FCRA and an employer's duty under Title VII to investigate
sexual harassment in the workplace. Part I discusses employer
liability for sexual harassment, employer obligations under the FCRA,
and the dilemma created by the FTC interpretation for employers
who retain outside agencies to investigate harassment complaints.
This part further examines why an employer may benefit from the
assistance of outside counsel or an independent investigator in the
effort to avoid liability for harassment.
Part II argues that the FTC's position regarding the applicability of
the FCRA to employers investigating harassment allegations is not
supported by the statutory language, congressional purpose, or
legislative history of the Act. Interpreting the FCRA to extend to
these investigations appears to provide an accused employee with
federal statutory protection against wrongful discharge due to an
employer's investigation that yields incorrect, incomplete, or obsolete
information. This protection, however, is illusory and contravenes the
intent of Congress with respect to the application of the FCRA and
the importance of Title VII investigations. The FCRA's notice and
disclosure requirements, if applicable to employer harassment
investigations conducted by a third party, would contravene the intent
of the FCRA, Title VII, and the guidelines promulgated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to implement Title
VI's protections. Furthermore, it would frustrate an employer's
ability to take prompt remedial action and thereby avert liability."0
An accused employee should be protected against wrongful discharge
or other disciplinary action based upon false, unsubstantiated, or
improper harassment complaints. The FCRA, however, is not the
appropriate mechanism to provide this protection.
Part III explores the solutions currently proposed by Congress and
the FTC to resolve this dilemma. Presently, there are two proposals
in the House of Representatives to amend the FCRA and eliminate
the statutory conflict between Title VII and the FCRA. Either of
these amendments, if enacted, would eliminate the employer's Catch-
22 with regard to third party investigations. It is not clear, however,
9. For further discussion on the conflict, see infra at Part II.A.
10. See discussion infra at Part I.A.2. about the employer's affirmative defense to
employer liability for sexual harassment.
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that these amendments are necessary, as the statutory language of the
FCRA and the Act's legislative history do not fully support the FTC's
interpretive opinion.
The FCRA is an inappropriate mechanism to protect a person
wrongfully accused of sexual harassment. Congress should clarify that
the consumer protections of the FCRA are inapplicable to an
employer who retains an outside agency to investigate allegations of
Title VII workplace discrimination. Given the complexities of
workplace discrimination law and the importance of preventing and
correcting harassment, it is incongruous to discourage employer
recourse to outside agencies that may help an employer efficiently and
fairly resolve a harassment complaint.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING Acr
This part details the current state of the law with respect to
employer liability for sexual harassment. It further discusses why an
employer has an incentive to use a third party such as outside counsel
or an independent investigator to develop anti-harassment policies
and investigate allegations of harassment. In addition, it describes the
scope of the FCRA, its content, and its application to employee
harassment complaint investigations. Finally, this part addresses the
conflict created by applying the FCRA to instances when employers
retain outside agencies to conduct sexual harassment investigations, as
required by Title VII.
A. Title VII Sexual Harassment and the Employer's Affirmative
Defense to Liability
Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are
liable for employee discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex
or national origin." Moreover, § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
authorizes punitive damages for intentional violations of Title VII.12
Although Congress passed Title VII in 1964, it was not until 1998 in
Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth13 and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton 4 that the Supreme Court clarified the nature and extent of
employer liability for sexual harassment."5 The following part
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
12. See id. §1981a.
13. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
14. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
15. Title VII states that an employer is liable for employment discrimination, but
does not set forth a standard for employer liability. See Justin P. Smith, Note, Letting
the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace after
Faragher and Burlington Indus., 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1786, 1789 (1999). The statute
does indicate congressional intent to hold an employer vicariously liable for the
actions of its agents by including "agent" in the statutory definition of "employer."
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Because Title VII itself provides no explicit mandate
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discusses the current standard determining employer liability for
sexual harassment.
1. Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment
The Supreme Court in its companion decisions in Ellerth6 and
Faragher7 created a two-factor test providing three distinct employer
liability standards. Employer liability is dependent upon two
considerations: first, does the harasser have authority over the
plaintiff; and second, was tangible employment action 18 taken against
the plaintiff. 9 These two factors form a tripartite regime of liability.20
The employer is strictly liable for harassment if the alleged harasser
has authority over the plaintiff and the employer has taken a tangible
regarding liability, both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
the agency authorized by Congress to administer Title VII, and courts interpreting
Title VII, have applied various liability standards to employers. See Smith, supra, at
1789. In doing so, the court or EEOC weighed factors such as the nature and result of
the harassment, the relationship between the plaintiff and the harasser, and the steps
taken by the plaintiff and the employer-defendant to alleviate the situation. See id. at
1787 (discussing liability standards that varied depending upon the underlying facts at
issue). Generally, the EEOC proposed, and courts applied, strict liability to
employers for quid pro quo harassment, which is harassment that occurs when a
supervisor withholds employment benefits as a means of coercing sexual favors. See
Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,777 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a)(2)); Achampong, supra note 4, at 17. The EEOC, and courts following
the EEOC's guidance, have applied a constructive notice liability standard to
employers for hostile work environment sexual harassment, i.e., an employer is liable
for harassment if it knew or should have known of the offensive behavior. See Smith,
supra, at 1794, 1838. Hostile work environment sexual harassment occurs when an
employee is subject to unwelcome conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).
16. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
17. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
18. The EEOC defines "tangible employment action" as any employment action
that is "a significant change in employment status." EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA),
Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Liability for Harassment by Supervisors, No. 249,
N:4075, N:4078 (June 18, 1999) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance] (quoting
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761). This includes discharge, demotion or undesirable
reassignment. See id at N:4078.
19. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Court in Faragher
explained why it is reasonable to hold employers more accountable for the actions of
supervisors than for the actions of ordinary employees:
Recognition of employer liability when discriminatory misuse of supervisory
authority alters the terms and conditions of a victim's employment is
underscored by the fact that the employer has a greater opportunity to guard
against misconduct by supervisors than by common workers; employers have
greater opportunity and incentive to screen them, train them, and monitor
their performance.
Id. at 803.
20. The considerations that the Supreme Court set forth to determine liability are
in sharp contrast to prior lower court holdings that looked mainly to the type of
harassment to which the plaintiff was subjected-whether quid pro quo or hostile
work environment. See supra note 15.
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employment action with respect to the plaintiff." In this situation, the
employer has no affirmative defense against liability for the conduct
of its employees or other agents.3
The employer is vicariously liable for harassment if the alleged
harasser has authority over the plaintiff even if the harassment
resulted in no negative employment action with respect to the
plaintiff.' In this situation, however, the employer has an affirmative
defense to vicarious liability. 4 This defense has two elements: the
defendant employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence
"(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise." 5
Lastly, if the alleged harasser has no authority over the plaintiff, the
employer is liable for harassment by a co-worker or other individual if
the employer is negligent under a constructive notice standard.26 To
21. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
22. See Smith, supra note 15, at 1795 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, and Faragher,
524 U.S. at 807-08).
23. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
24. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
25. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. By creating the employer's
affirmative defense, the Supreme Court afforded less protection to employees
subjected to supervisor harassment than did the EEOC and prior circuit court
holdings, which generally imposed strict liability in all instances of supervisory
harassment without an affirmative defense. In the past, EEOC guidelines held an
employer responsible for all harassment by a supervisor "regardless of whether the
specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence."
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1993). The EEOC's position was based on the reasoning that
the supervisor essentially "relies upon his apparent or actual authority to extort
sexual consideration from an employee." Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910
(11th Cir. 1982). In accord, a majority of circuits held an employer strictly liable for
quid pro quo harassment once established by the plaintiff, regardless of whether
tangible employment action was taken. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 953 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 914-15 (1st Cir. 1988);
Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213
(1994); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1989);
Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77,79 (3d Cir. 1983); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,
257 (4th Cir. 1983); Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 803-04 (6th
Cir. 1994); Crimm v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 750 F.2d 703, 713 (8th Cir. 1984); Nichols
v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1994); Henson, 682 F.2d at 905. The EEOC
rescinded its guideline of unqualified vicarious employer liability for supervisor
harassment after the Ellerth and Faragher decisions. See EEOC, EEOC Updates
Guidelines to Comply with Supreme Court Rulings on Employer Liability for
Harassment by Supervisors (last modified Oct. 29, 1999) <www.eeoc.gov/press/10-29-
99.html>.
26. See Smith, supra note 15, at 1795. The Supreme Court has never decided a
case of non-supervisory sexual harassment. Almost all circuits addressing hostile
work environment by a non-supervisory employee have applied a constructive notice
standard. See id.; see also note 15 supra (discussing the constructive notice standard
[Vol. 69
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prevail on a claim of non-supervisory sexual harassment, a plaintiff
must show that his or her employer knew or should have known of the
offensive behavior and nevertheless failed to take prompt remedial
action. 7 This standard is in accord with the EEOC guidelines. 28
2. The Two-Pronged Affirmative Defense
If a supervisor harasses an employee, but that employee suffered no
significant change in employment status, the employer can escape
liability by asserting an affirmative defense.29 The employer must
show that (1) he or she exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct the harassment; and (2) the employee failed to take advantage
of the preventative or corrective opportunities that the employer
provided.'
The first prong of the affirmative defense requires a "showing by
the employer that it undertook reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct harassment."3  A comprehensive compliance
program, including a clear anti-harassment policy and complaint
procedure, is essential for an employer to show that it is exercising
such care.32 This type of policy should include a formal statement
for hostile work environment sexual harassment).
27. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
28. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1999).
29. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. See also EEOC
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 18, at N:4081 (discussing the Supreme Court's
decisions for the benefit of small business owners wishing to comply with current
liability standards).
30. There remains a constructive notice standard for employee liability when the
alleged harasser is a non-supervisory employee or other individual. See supra notes
26-28. Thus, there is, in effect, an affirmative defense based on constructive notice.
Many of the actions taken by an employer to establish facts for the affirmative
defense for supervisory harassment would also establish a defense to employer
negligence for non-supervisory harassment based on the constructive notice standard.
31. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 18, at N:4081.
32. See id. at N:4081-83 ("Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-
harassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.") (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 764 (1998)). As a matter of law, a harassment policy is not necessary to find that an
employer exercised reasonable care. The Supreme Court, however, indicated that
failure to have a policy will make it difficult for an employer to prove that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. The
EEOC provides advice to employers to help them comply with Title VII and to take
advantage of the affirmative defense articulated by the Supreme Court. See generally
EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 18, at N:4079-87 (discussing the duty of
both an employee and employer to exercise reasonable care as a two-prong
affirmative defense). Every workplace and every case of harassment is different and
the steps an employer must take to discharge its duty will vary from case to case. The
sufficiency of policies, investigations, and remedial measures depend upon the size of
the employer and the specific facts of the harassment itself. See id. at N:4085-86. For
instance, small employers may be able to address harassment complaints by an
informal process, while a larger corporation may need to provide more formal
measures. See id. Similarly, an employer's duty of care is dependent upon, among
other things, the nature and effect of the harassment and the relationship between the
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prohibiting harassment,33 protection against retaliation, 4 a complaint
process,35 an investigative process,36 and assurance of immediate and
appropriate corrective action when necessary.37 Finally, EEOC
Guidance Manuals underscore the importance of the assurance of
confidentiality.38
To satisfy the second prong of the affirmative defense, the employer
must show that the plaintiff "unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.' ' 39 Thus, an employer who
exercised reasonable care to prevent or correct harassment is not
liable to a plaintiff if that person could have avoided harm or taken
measures provided by the employer to reduce it.4
0
By establishing a clear standard for employer liability, the Supreme
Court created an incentive for employers to establish effective anti-
harassment policies and complaint procedures and to conduct
comprehensive investigations upon the filing of a complaint.41
Furthermore, employees who are subject to harassment are required
to use the employer's complaint procedure, thereby alerting the
employer to possible harassment.42
Although the Supreme Court clarified the standard of liability, it
remains unclear how these standards will be implemented in any given
case. The EEOC warns employers that "[t]here are no 'safe harbors'
for employers" and that "[e]ven the best policy and complaint
procedure will not alone satisfy the burden of proving reasonable care
if, in the particular circumstances of a claim, the employer failed to
implement its process effectively. '43 As a result, should a case go to
complainant and the alleged harasser. See id. at N:4077-78.
33. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 18, at N:4082 ("An employer's
policy should make clear that it will not tolerate harassment based on sex (with or
without sexual conduct).").
34. See id. at N:4082 ("An employer should make clear that it will not tolerate
adverse treatment of employees because they report harassment or provide
information related to such complaints.").
35. See id. at N:4082-83 ("An employer's harassment complaint procedure should
be designed to encourage victims to come forward.").
36. See id. at N:4083 ("An employer should set up a mechanism for a prompt,
thorough, and impartial investigation into alleged harassment.").
37. See id. at N:4084-85 ("An employer should make clear that it will undertake
immediate and appropriate corrective action, including discipline, whenever it
determines that harassment has occurred in violation of the employer's policy.").
38. See id. at N:4083 ("An employer should make clear to employees that it will
protect the confidentiality of harassment allegations to the extent possible.").
39. Id. at N:4086 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)
and Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998)).
40. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 18, at N:4086. If the employee
could have avoided some, but not the entire harm, the employer's affirmative defense
will mitigate damages. See id.
41. See id. at N:4081.
42 See id.
43. Id. The EEOC provides an example: if an employer has an effective policy
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trial, an employer cannot know with certainty whether it has taken
adequate measures to avoid the court's imposition of liability.
3. The Use of Outside Counsel or an Independent Investigator
Many employers turn to outside counsel or independent
investigators for assistance in the development and implementation of
anti-harassment policies.' An attorney or an independent
investigator can help an employer minimize liability by developing
effective anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures prior to a
complaint and by conducting an independent investigation when an
employee files a complaint. Small employers may not have adequate
resources or experience to conduct a sufficient investigation, so they
may hire an outside agency to do the job. 5 Larger corporations may
benefit from a comprehensive compliance program that promulgates
appropriate standards of conduct and is enforced by training,
monitoring, and detection procedures. In all cases, employers will be
aided greatly by outside counsel or independent investigators who
have more experience in creating programs and investigating
allegations in compliance with applicable law.
Moreover, after a complaint has been filed with an employer,
outside counsel or an independent investigator can help an employer
by directing an appropriate response to the complaint, conducting an
independent investigation, and making recommendations based upon
the findings.' The enhanced credibility of an independent
investigation becomes particularly important when complaints allege
misconduct by high-ranking supervisory employees.
4. Title VII Protections and Common Law Remedies for Wrongful
Discharge
An employer is prohibited by Title VII from retaliating against an
employee who files a harassment complaint.' For instance, an
and complaint procedure and adequately responded to employee's complaint, it may
still be liable for harassment if management in the past had ignored similar complaints
about the same alleged harasser. See id.
44. See Titus E. Aaron, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Guide to the Law
and a Research Overview for Employers and Employees 125 (1993).
45. Many small businesses have limited financial resources, compounding the
devastation of an adverse judgment. See Achampong, supra note 4, at 158.
46. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 18, at N:4083 ("The alleged
harasser should not have supervisory authority over the individual who conducts the
investigation and should not have any direct or indirect control over the
investigation.").
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). This section states that:
it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
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employer cannot discharge or take any other adverse employment
action against an employee who has filed a complaint.48 By providing
this protection, Title VII alters the traditional employment-at-will
doctrine under common law, which allows an employer to terminate
an employee for good cause or no cause without being subject to civil
liability.49
Title VII offers no similar protections to the employee accused of
harassment or terminated on the basis of a false or unsubstantiated
complaint." As a result, unless otherwise modified by an employment
contract or applicable state law, the accused employee is subject to the
common law employment-at-will doctrine, and can be terminated by
the employer for good cause or no cause. 1 A wrongfully discharged
employee is left only with common-law remedies, such as breach of
contract, 2 intentional infliction of emotional distress, 3 defamation,
invasion of privacy, 55 abuse of process, 56 negligent misrepresentation, 7
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.
Id; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's directive
that an employer may not retaliate against an employee who files a harassment
complaint).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
49. See Aaron, supra note 44, at 140-41.
50. See id. at 13.
51. See Mark A. Rothstein, Employment Law § 8.2 (2d ed. 1999).
52. A cause of action for breach of an employment contract must be premised on
the existence of an actual employment contract or an implied employment contract
arising from an employee handbook or employer policy, which serves to alter the
traditional at-will employment agreement. See Aaron, supra note 44, at 141. Courts
have looked at whether the handbook, or other document upon which the employee
relies, is sufficiently definite to give rise to a contractual employment relationship and
if the parties intended to be bound by the handbook provisions. See id. Employee
handbooks that constitute an implied employment contract often establish procedures
for employee discharge that must first be exhausted. See id. These procedures can
include a duty to investigate or they may provide for termination only for "just cause"
or "good cause." See id.
53. An employee may make a common-law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress if the employer "by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress .... " Restatement (Second) of Torts §
46(1) (1965).
54. An employer may be vicariously liable to the accused harasser for
unauthorized defamatory statements made by the complainant-employee during the
scope and course of employment, unless the employer is found to be immune. See
Aaron, supra note 44, at 159. As a general rule, employers are granted immunity
from defamation for statements made during the course of administrative and judicial
proceedings. See id.
55. An employer or complainant-employee may be liable for invasion of privacy
resulting from publicity that places a wrongfully accused employee in a false light,
where the publicity is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and where the speaker
had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized
matter. See id. at 158 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977)).
56. An employer may be vicariously liable to the accused harasser for abuse of
process if the complainant-employee files an administrative proceeding or a lawsuit
against him for an improper purpose, such as to retaliate against him or to gain an
[Vol. 69
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civil conspiracy, or malicious prosecution." All of these causes of
action are based upon a complainant's untruthful allegations and/or
the employer's reliance upon them, resulting in an employee's
wrongful discharge or other negative consequences. The remedies
vary from state to state and do not offer the same protection to the
wrongfully accused employee against employer retaliation that Title
VII offers to the complainant.
The FFC has officially endorsed the interpretation that the
protections of the FCRA apply to employers who utilize an outside
agency to investigate harassment allegations.' This interpretation
serves to provide some form of federal statutory protection to an
employee accused of harassment in addition to the common-law
remedies discussed above. Under this interpretation, the employer
must fulfill notice obligations prior to initiating an investigation and
must also comply with disclosure obligations before terminating or
taking any other adverse employment action against an employee"
These protections, however, are arguably neither sufficient nor
properly devised to afford an accused employee with substantive
protection against false complaints or discharge by an employer who
does little or no investigation.' The FCRA was not designed or
intended to apply in the case of third party investigations into sexual
harassment. Such an application of the FCRA frustrates an
employer's recourse to the affirmative defense for vicarious liability
for sexual harassment, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Ellerth
and Faragher.
B. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 to regulate the information
reporting industry and to protect consumer privacy.6 Businesses that
undue advantage in a promotion decision. See id. at 159 (citing Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 682 (1977)).
57. A claim for negligent misrepresentation is premised upon the complainant's
negligence in giving false information to the employer, upon which the employer
relies. See id at 160 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977)).
58. The employer, the complainant-employee, and others may be liable for civil
conspiracy where two or more people agree to wrongfully accuse an employee of
sexual harassment to cause the discharge of that employee. See id. at 161. The
wrongfully accused employee must allege (1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2)
wrongful acts in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) damages resulting from these
acts. See id.
59. The complainant-employee may be liable for malicious prosecution if he
brings a sexual harassment claim against an employee without probable cause and for
an improper purpose. See id. at 158-61.
60. See FTC Letter, supra note 7.
61. See infra Part I.B.3. for a discussion of notice and disclosure requirements
triggered when an employer retains a third party to investigate sexual harassment
allegations.
62- See infra Part I.C.
63. See Fair Credit Note, supra note 6, at 819. Congress amended the Consumer
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offer credit, insurance, or employment to individuals often seek to
minimize the risk of loss by purchasing information to screen
applicants to determine, among other things, credit risk.' 4 Congress
considered the collection and sale of personal information to be
invasive of an individual's privacy.' Moreover, an individual could be
denied credit, insurance, or employment based upon inaccurate,
disputed, or obsolete information. 66 Thus, the main purpose of the
FCRA is to ensure that agencies that gather and report personal
information act with "fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the
consumer's right to privacy."'67 An individual has a cause of action
under the FCRA if either the information provider or the information
user willfully or negligently fails to comply with the protective
measures of the FCRA.68
The FCRA regulates data collection agencies and the type of
information these agencies may collect, compile, and disseminate. 69 It
also restricts the circumstances under which a business may request a
report from an agency about an individual.70
1. Information Reporting Agencies Regulated by the FCRA
Only agencies that fall under the FCRA's definition of "consumer
reporting agency" ("CRA") are subject to the restrictions of the
FCRA.71 The statute defines a CRA as:
[A]ny person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative
nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice
of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other
information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of
interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing
consumer reports.72
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, which addresses truth and lending and
related credit matters, by adding a new title, Title VI, known as the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, Pub. L. 91-508 § 602, 84 Stat. 1136.
64. See Fair Credit Note, supra note 6, at 819.
65. See id.
66. See id. During the House Hearings on the Act, examples of this risk were
discussed. See Fair Credit Reporting: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of Consumer
Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1970).
67. FCRA § 602(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1681. Prior to the enactment of the FCRA in
1970, this industry was completely unregulated by federal statute. See Fair Credit
Note, supra note 6, at 819 n.1. Only Oklahoma regulated the industry to some extent
with a state statute. See id.
68. See FCRA §§ 616-617, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-o.
69. See id. § 605, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c.
70. See id. § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
71. See id. § 603(0, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
72 Id.
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There are two main types of information reporting agencies,
depository and investigative, that fall within this definition.73
Depository CRAs are retail credit bureaus and other agencies that
routinely collect information on individuals without regard to whether
the collected information is requested or likely to be requested by a
user of a report.74 Depository CRAs generally collect credit history
information, such as existing obligations and past payment
performance, and public information, such as arrests, indictments,
suits, liens, and outstanding judgments.' Upon a request for a report
from an employer or business, the depository CRA does not seek out
new information that had not already been collected on the individual.
Unlike a depository CRA, an investigative CRA does not routinely
collect and maintain information on individuals. Rather, an
investigative CRA obtains necessary and relevant information when
an employer or business requests it. For example, an employer may
engage an investigative CRA to speak to past employers of a
prospective employee about that individual's job performance. An
investigative CRA may supply some or all of the same information
provided by a depository CRA, but it will supplement that
information with personal interviews of neighbors, friends, or
associates of the subject of the report. Information provided by an
investigative CRA tends to be more comprehensive than that
provided by a depository CRA.76
According to the FTC, an outside agency, such as a law firm or a
private investigator, is a CRA because, as per the CRA statutory
definition, it, in whole or in part, "assemble[s] or evaluate[s]"
information on an individual at the request of its client, the
employer.' Assume, as an example, that an employer receives a
formal complaint of sexual harassment filed by an employee.
73. See Fair Credit Note, supra note 6, at 819-20.
74. Examples of agencies that fall into this category are Equifax Credit
Information Services, First Data Solutions, Lexis-Nexis, Trans Union Corp., and CDB
InfoTek. These agencies and others have collaborated to "respond, as an industry, to
heightened interest in the industry's practices," specifically with regard to compliance
with the FCRA. See Individual Reference Services Industry Practices (visited July 2,
1999) <http'//www.cdb. com/publicdnew.irsg.html>. Depository CRAs typically
collect information from credit card companies and other institutions that extend
credit to individuals, such as department stores. They also collect public information,
such as information from the court system. See Fair Credit Note, supra note 6, at 820.
75. See Fair Credit Note, supra note 6, at 820 (citing Fair Credit Reporting:
Hearing on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Banking and Currency Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1969)).
76. See id. For instance, an insurance company may direct an investigative CRA
to collect information regarding an applicant's health, morals, hobbies, and drinking
and smoking habits. See id.
77. See Keller Letter, supra note 6 ("It seems reasonably clear that the outside
organizations utilized by employers to assist in their investigations of harassment
claims 'assemble or evaluate' information," which is the primary consideration in the
definition of a CRA.).
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Pursuant to the employer's anti-harassment policy, the employer
refers the complaint to an outside agency for a quick, thorough, and
independent investigation. Should the outside agency gather and
evaluate any information about the alleged harasser, or any other
individual involved, the agency is a CRA according to the FTC.78
2. Types of Information Regulated by the FCRA
The FCRA provides that a CRA may only issue a "consumer
report" under certain circumstances.79  The FTC considers
information provided by an outside agency pursuant to a harassment
investigation a "consumer report" as defined by the FCRA.80 The
FCRA defines "consumer report" as follows:
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used
or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the
purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's
eligibility for (A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes; (B) employment purposes;
or (C) any other purposes authorized under section 604.81
The FTC official opinion interprets this definition as including a
report prepared on sexual harassment allegations.' First, the report
prepared by an outside agency necessarily reflects upon the character,
general reputation, or personal characteristics of the subject of the
report. 3 Second, the outside agency collects information with the
expectation that the resultant report will be used for employment
purposes.8" A report is used for "employment purposes" if it is used
for "the purpose of evaluating a consumer for employment,
promotion, reassignment or retention as an employee."'  For
instance, an employer receives a consumer report when it requests
information from a CRA regarding a prospective employee's past
criminal history. By the plain meaning of the statute, the employer
78. See FTC Letter, supra note 7.
79. See FCRA § 604(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
80. See FTC Letter, supra note 7.
81. FCRA § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). See also Korotki v. Attorney Servs.
Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1269, 1274-75 (D. Md. 1996) (holding a report is a consumer
report even if not ultimately used by the individual that requests the information for
one of the purposes in the FCRA). None of the other authorized purposes included
in § 604 are remotely applicable to workplace investigations of any kind.
82. See Keller Letter, supra note 6.
83. See id.; Letter from Thomas E. Kane, Attorney, Federal Trade Commission,
Division of Credit Practices, to Carolann G. Hinkle (July 9, 1998) (visited July 1,
1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/hinkle.htm>.
84. See Keller Letter, supra note 6.
85. FCRA § 603(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(h).
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also requests a consumer report if it requests a report prepared in
response to a harassment investigation.'
The CRA prepares an "investigative consumer report," which is a
special type of consumer report, if it obtains information about an
individual from interviews with his or her friends, neighbors, or
associates. 87 The FCRA places additional restrictions on the use of
investigative consumer reports to provide increased privacy protection
for the individual by recognizing that interviews can be particularly
invasive of the individual's privacy.88
In summary, the FTC interprets the FCRA to extend to harassment
investigations conducted by outside agencies because: (1) an outside
agency "assembles or evaluates" information upon the employer's
request and is, therefore, a CRA;s (2) the CRA prepares a consumer
report on the alleged harasser or other subject because the report will
contain information reflecting upon the employee's reputation and
character; 9° and (3) the CRA collects the information knowing that
the employer will use the report for employment purposes, namely to
decide whether to retain an employee. 91
3. Consumer Protections Imposed by the FCRA
Both the CRA that prepares a report and the party that requests
it-in this case the employer-have FCRA obligations to the subject
of a consumer report, the alleged harasser.'
To procure a consumer report, an employer must comply with
notice and disclosure requirements. 93 The employer must provide
notice to the subject that it intends to procure a consumer report from
a CRA for employment purposes.' Statutory notice consists of two
elements. First, the employer must notify the employee that the
86. See Keller Letter, supra note 6.
87. See FCRA § 603(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100 for a discussion of FCRA consumer
protections implicated in the use of an investigative consumer report.
89. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
91. See Keller Letter, supra note 6.
92. A detailed discussion of the duties and obligations in contexts other than
employment is beyond the scope of this Note. For such a discussion, see generally
Myers, supra note 5 (discussing the construction, application, and enforcement of the
FCRA).
93. See FCRA §§ 604(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii), 15 U.S.C. § 168lb(b)(2)(A), (B) &
604(b)(3)(A)(i), (ii), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A), (B). Congress adopted the FCRA
notice and disclosure requirements in the context of employment investigations in
1996, along with a number of other amendments to the Act. See FCRA, Pub. L No.
104-208 (1996).
94. See id. § 604(b)(2)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A). For the purposes of this
obligation, the employer may not proceed vith the request for a consumer report
unless "a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer
at any time before the report is procured ... in a document that consists solely of the
disclosure." Id.
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employer intends to obtain a consumer report.' Second, the
employee, in writing, must authorize the employer to procure the
report.96 The employer must then certify to the CRA that it has
complied, and will continue to comply, with all statutory notice and
disclosure requirements. 97
If the employer intends to retain an outside agency to prepare an
investigative consumer report, additional consumer safeguards
apply.98 The employer must "clearly and accurately" disclose to the
employee that the report to be procured will include "information as
to the subject's character, general reputation, personal characteristics
and mode of living." 9  Notice obligations extend beyond those
required when the employer requests an ordinary consumer report.
Upon written request by the employee, the employer must "make a
complete and accurate disclosure of the nature and scope of the
investigation requested."" °
If an employer takes an adverse employment action' °1 with respect
to any employee based in whole or in part on a consumer report, the
employer must comply with additional FCRA disclosure
requirements.1 2 The employer must disclose an unredacted report to
the subject, as well as a written description of his or her rights under
the FCRA.103 For example, if an employer decides on the basis of a
consumer report to transfer, demote, or terminate the employment of
an alleged harasser, the employer must provide the report, in full, to
the employee. 1°4
CRAs have a duty to follow "reasonable procedures" to assure
"maximum possible accuracy" 0 5 and are required to disclose
information to a consumer upon the consumer's request.106 The CRA
cannot include obsolete information in a report,'0 and it must employ
95. See id. § 604(b)(2)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
96. See id. § 604(b)(2)(A)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(B).
97. See id. § 604(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(1)(A)-(B).
98. See text at note 87 supra for the definition of an investigative consumer
report.
99. FCRA § 606(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a)(1). This notice must be mailed or
otherwise delivered within three days after the date on which the report was
requested. See id. § 606(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a)(1)(A).
100. Id. § 606(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(b).
101. The FCRA defines "adverse action" in the employment context as "a denial
of employment or any other decision for employment purposes that adversely affects
any current or prospective employee." Id. § 603(k)(1)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. §
1681a(k)(1)(B)(ii).
102. See id. § 604(b)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A).
103. See id. § 604(b)(3)(A)(i)-(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)-(B).
104. See Keller Letter, supra note 6.
105. FCRA § 607(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
106. See id. § 609(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a).
107. See id. §605(a)(1)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1)-(6). For the purposes of the
FCRA, civil suits, judgments, liens, paid tax liens, arrests, and convictions that
antedate the report by seven years, and bankruptcies older than ten years, are
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reasonable verification procedures to guard against inaccurate
information 3 8 In the event that the subject of a report disputes
information in the report, the CRA must reinvestigate the
information.' 9  Additionally, the CRA must determine that
employers who request an investigation and report have identified
themselves and certified that they intend to use the report for a
permissible purpose under the FCRA, such as for employment
purposes."0 The CRA must also ensure that the employer certifies
that he or she has discharged the FCRA notice and disclosure
obligations."'
The FCRA imposes civil liability on any person who willfully or
negligently fails to comply with any requirement of the Act."' An
employee can file suit against either the CRA for failure to follow
reasonable procedures to ensure maximum accuracy, or against his or
her employer for failure to comply with notice and disclosure
requirements. Recovery is limited by the FCRA to actual damages
and costs suffered as a result of the failure to comply.113 In the case of
willful noncompliance, however, the court may award punitive
damages against the CRA or the employer.114
Applying the FCRA consumer protections to harassment
investigations by outside agencies would marginally protect the
privacy of the accused employee, but would also greatly reduce an
employer's ability to conduct thorough, prompt, independent and fair
investigations, which are required to limit Title VII liability, as the
next section demonstrates.
obsolete and may not be collected or reported by a CRA. See id.
10& See id. § 607(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
109. See iU. § 611(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)-(d). The CRA's reinvestigation of
the disputed transaction must be done free of charge and within 30 days. See id.
§ 611(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). The consumer may submit information to
be considered by the CRA during the reinvestigation. See id. § 611(a)(4), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681i(a)(4). If, after the reinvestigation, the CRA determines that the disputed
information is "inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified," the CRA must delete
the information from the consumer's file and from all consumer reports. Id. §
611(a)(5)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A). If the investigation does not resolve the
dispute, the consumer may "file a brief statement setting forth the nature of the
dispute," to be included in all subsequent consumer reports prepared for employers
or businesses. Id. § 611(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b). Prior to the FCRA, a merchant
might attempt to coerce payment for defective merchandise by threatening to report
an instance of non-payment to a credit bureau, which would tarnish a consumer's
credit rating. See Fair Credit Note, supra note 6, at 832.
110. See FCRA § 607(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a).
111. See id. § 607(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(d). Employer and business notice and
disclosure obligations are discussed supra at notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
112. See FCRA §§ 616-617, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n-o.
113. See id. §§ 616(a)(1)(A)-(B), 617(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A)-(B),
o(a)(1).
114. See id. § 616(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2).
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C. The Dilemma Created by the FTC's Interpretation
In recent months, the conflict between an employer's simultaneous
obligations under the FCRA and Title VII has been well documented,
culminating in a House of Representative Subcommittee Hearing on
May 4, 2000.115 This part discusses the conflict created by the FTC
position from the perspective of the employer, the employee who
believes he or she is being harassed, witnesses to the alleged
harassment, and the employee suspected of this behavior.
The FTC position discourages employers from seeking independent
professional guidance to aid in the development of anti-harassment
procedures and the investigation of harassment complaints. The
employer's affirmative defense to Title VII sexual harassment liability
encourages employers to take steps to prevent harassment and to take
prompt, remedial actions should it occur.16 To that end, employers
have an incentive to retain outside agencies to develop effective
policies and perform independent investigations.1 1 7 The FCRA simply
does not allow this.
Consistent with the FTC's position, an employer must notify an
alleged harasser of a pending investigation and get that employee's
authorization to begin.11 8  Satisfaction of these requirements may
delay an employer's response to a complaint." 9 The authorization
requirement gives the alleged harasser control over the employer's
investigation. As such, the employee could refuse to authorize the
investigation, disabling the employer from carrying out its own anti-
harassment procedures, which may include an investigation by an
outside agency. The employer would have to carry out an
investigation without experienced help. A delayed response to a
complaint or the lack of an independent investigation make it much
more difficult for the employer to show that it exercised reasonable
care in a subsequent harassment suit.2 This could be especially
115. A hearing was held in the Committee on Banking and Financial Services,
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, in response to H.R.
3408, a house bill introduced by Representative Pete Sessions in an attempt to resolve
this dilemma by congressional action. Transcripts of testimony presented at the
Subcommittee Hearing are available on the Internet at
http://www.house.govfbanking.htm.
116. See supra Part I.A.2. The affirmative defense to vicarious liability requires a
court to evaluate the adequacy of an employer's complaint procedures and actions in
response to the complaint of harassment.
117. See Part I.A.3. supra for a discussion of the benefits of using outside counsel
or another independent investigative agency to develop and enforce an anti-
harassment policy.
118. See discussion supra at notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 37 and accompanying text discussing the importance of
immediate corrective response by the employee.
120. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
employer's duty of reasonable care, including prompt response to a complaint and an
independent harassment investigation.
[Vol. 69
2000] CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FCRA AND TITLE VII 227
troublesome for an employer facing potential liability for a high-level
supervisory employee's alleged harassment of a subordinate where it
may be difficult for an employer to show that it conducted an
independent and impartial investigation.2 1
If, after an outside agency's investigation, the employer takes any
adverse employment action with respect to the subject of the report,
the employer must first disclose the contents of the report to that
employee.= Employees cannot rely on any assurance of
confidentiality if disclosure of the investigative report is statutorily
required.' Full disclosure will likely have a chilling effect on
employee reporting of offensive behavior. 21 Similarly, it may
discourage witnesses from participating in the investigation.1t An
employer who is unable to offer any assurance of confidentiality will
have a difficult time showing that it took reasonable care to prevent or
correct harassment, or that an employee's failure to use the
established complaint procedure was unreasonable. Moreover, the
disclosure requirement may delay an employee's complaint response
because it must deliver the report to the accused employee prior to
taking any adverse action.126
The FCRA also presents a dilemma from the perspective of the
employee whom the FTC is purportedly protecting. At first glance,
FCRA notice and disclosure requirements appear to provide
protection from unfair treatment to an employee who is wrongfully
accused of harassment. 27  This protection, however, is illusory.
Because FCRA consumer protections only apply if the employer
procures a report to use for employment purposes, such as to
"evaluat[e] a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or
retention as an employee,"" the FCRA is not triggered if the
121. See supra note 36.
122- See discussion supra at notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of
the assurance of confidentiality of harassment investigations. It should be recognized
that the employer must disclose the report to the harasser prior to taking some
adverse employment action against him or her. Thus, the alleged harasser will likely
have reason to be upset with those that participated in the investigation, and feel that
he or she has little to lose in venting these feelings.
124. The American Bar Association, in a letter to the FTC requesting a
reinterpretation of the FCRA, discussed the importance of confidentiality in
harassment complaints and investigations. See Pitney, Hardin, Kipp & Szuch LLP,
ABA Asks FTC to Revoke FCRA Application to Sexual Harassment Investigations, 12
NJ. Employment L. Letter 5, Oct. 1999. Requiring notice to the accused employee
and disclosure of the final and unredacted report may discourage an employee from
filing a complaint.
125. See id (indicating that an empty assurance of confidentiality may prevent
witnesses from cooperating in investigations).
126. See supra note 37 discussing the employer's duty to take immediate corrective
action when harassment has been found to exist or have taken place.
127. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
128. FCRA § 603(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1994).
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employer terminates the employee before initiating an outside agency
investigation. If the individual no longer works for the employer, the
report could not be generated for employment purposes.12 9 Under the
FTC's position, an employer will best avoid both Title VII and FCRA
liability by immediately terminating any employee against whom a
complaint is filed.
The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that an employer can
avoid vicarious liability for sexual harassment by providing adequate
complaint procedures for employee-reporting and by taking prompt
corrective action when a complaint is filed.30 The FTC's application
of the FCRA to an employer's harassment investigation conducted by
a third party conflicts with the employer's obligation under Title VII
and impedes an employer's recourse to the affirmative defense. 3
Moreover, the employee whom the FTC has attempted to protect by
interposing the FCRA requirements is also in a worse position, as a
trigger-happy employer wishing to avoid all possible liability now has
an increased incentive to terminate the employment of any employee
against whom a complaint is filed. 131
II. THE FCRA SHOULD NOT APPLY TO THIRD PARTY
HARASSMENT INVESTIGATIONS
The FTC has indicated that its interpretation of the FCRA is
merited because of the important privacy and procedural rights that
the Act provides to employees when an employer retains an outside
agency to conduct a workplace investigation.33 Although under a
very broad reading of the FCRA the FTC position may be supported
by the plain meaning of the Act, it is not logical in practice. The
FCRA should not apply to employers who retain outside agencies to
conduct sexual harassment investigations. First, an employer who
retains an outside agency to investigate harassment does so for a legal
purpose, not for an employment purpose as defined by the FCRA.
Second, applying the FCRA to investigative reports does not serve the
129. In an employment-at-will arrangement, the employer may terminate an
employee for good cause or no cause. See Aaron, supra note 44, at 140. The
employment-at-will doctrine in the United States has "become the unquestioned and
central rule of employment law." Rothstein, supra note 51, § 8.2. An employer would
have no obligations under the FCRA should he or she terminate the employee
because the report subsequently procured from the CRA could not possibly be used
to evaluate the employee for any employment purpose, due to the fact that the
individual is no longer in the employ of the employer.
130. See supra Part I.A.2. for a discussion on the affirmative defense to liability
created by the Supreme Court in the Ellerth and Faragher decisions.
131. See supra Part I.A.3. discussing the conflict.
132. See supra Part I.A.3. discussing the conflict.
133. See Hearing on the Fair Credit Reporting Act Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit (2000) (prepared statement of Debra
Valentine, General Counsel of the FTC) available at
http://www.house.gov/5400val.htm [hereinafter FTC Testimony].
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congressional purpose of the Act. Finally, the employment agreement
between the employer and employee should supersede the obligations
of the FCRA, just as, in the case of insurance, the insurance contract
between the insured and the insurer supersedes FCRA requirements.
A. Legal Purpose, Not Employment Purpose
An employer retains an outside agency, particularly outside
counsel, to provide legal advice to the employer in order to comply
with Title VII duties and prepare an affirmative defense to employer
liability for sexual harassment."M The FCRA only applies when
employers use reports to take "corrective or disciplinary action" with
respect to an employee. 3 5 If a report is not used for this purpose, the
FCRA does not apply.
Recently, one court has refused to consider a report by outside
counsel, prepared to provide legal advice to an employer, as within
the definition of consumer report of the FCRA. In Robinson v. Time
Warner, Inc.,"3 an employee brought a Title VII workplace
harassment action against his employer and sought discovery of an
investigation report prepared by the employer's outside counsel to
investigate the employee's allegations. 13 The plaintiff relied upon the
FCRA and the-FTC's opinion in the Keller Letter to compel disclosure
of the law firm's report.1m A Southern District of New York court
held that the questions asked by outside counsel and the responses
received during the course of the investigation were all done for a
legal purpose and in anticipation of litigation. Therefore, according to
the court, this particular report "[fell] squarely within the ambit of
Upjohn Co. v. United States," and was protected against compelled
discovery by the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine, absent a showing of need. 9 The court declined to apply the
FCRA to compel the employer to disclose the report.'
This reasoning is consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in
Ellerth'41 and Faragher.'42 With the formulation of the affirmative
defense, employers have greater incentive to conduct a full, adequate,
134. See supra Part I.A.2. discussing the employer's affirmative defense to liability.
135. See Keller Letter, supra note 6; see also supra Part I.B.
136. 187 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
137. See id. at 146.
138. See id at 148 n.2; Keller Letter, supra note 6.
139. Robinson, 187 F.R-D. at 146 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981)). As a result, the plaintiff was not entitled to ask counsel or any other
employee about the substance of the report or the particular questions asked or
answers received during the course of employee interviews. See id. ("[T]he [attorney-
client] privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those
who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to
give sound and informed advice.") (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390).
140. See id. at 148.
141. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
142. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). See supra Part I.A.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
and independent investigation of sexual harassment complaints in
order to strengthen their defense in the event of a lawsuit. As the
Robinson Court found, these investigations are conducted for a legal
purpose. 43  This incentive would be greatly reduced by a
reclassification of the report's goal as one prepared for an
"employment purpose." One purpose of the attorney-client privilege,
to encourage the free-flow of information, would be compromised if
the employer and all witness-employees were aware that the
harassment investigation report would be disclosed to the alleged
harasser should the employer take adverse action against him or her.
This would greatly reduce the value of any investigation undertaken
by outside counsel.
B. Notice and Disclosure to the Alleged Harasser Does Not Further
the Intent of the FCRA
Congress enacted the FCRA, as reflected in its language and its
legislative history, in order to protect consumers' financial well-being
and the financial system from the effects of inaccurate credit
reports.'" FCRA consumer protections provide a consumer with
notice that an insurance company, credit agency, or employer is using
information to evaluate him or to provide the consumer with an
opportunity to correct any inaccurate, obsolete, or disputed
information that leads to an adverse decision.' 45 The consumer's
cause of action under the FCRA is predicated on the reporting of, and
reliance upon, inaccurate, obsolete, or disputed information. The
FCRA is neither a proper nor an efficient way to protect an employee
accused of harassment from the reporting of, or an employer's
reliance upon, such information.
An alleged harasser will not generally be able to inspect an
investigative sexual harassment report the same way that he might
check a credit report for inaccuracies. Interviews with the
complainant-employee and other employees or witnesses conducted
by outside agencies during an investigation are likely to be subjective
opinions and observations, and thus, not easily shown by the accused
to be inaccurate. Witness interviews will yield observations on
workplace atmosphere and the accused employee's conduct. For
instance, an outside agency, having conducted interviews with
witnesses to the alleged harassment, may include in a report that a
witness indicated that the offensive conduct by the alleged harasser
made him or her uncomfortable. This information is important to the
employer to determine if there is harassment, for which the employer
143. See Robinson, 187 F.R.D. at 146.
144. See FCRA § 604(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1681; see also 116 Cong. Rec. 35,941 (1970)
(emphasizing the importance of providing consumer protection for credit report
inaccuracies).
145. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
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may be liable, especially for hostile work environment sexual
harassment, for which a reasonable person similarly situated to the
complainant must perceive the offensive behavior to be severe or
pervasive.' 46 FCRA consumer protections will be ineffective in this
context to protect against most inaccuracies as the employer is not in a
position to check the accuracy of the opinions and observations of the
complainant-employee or other witnesses interviewed by the outside
agency.
In its traditional application, the FCRA protects individuals from
the reporting of and reliance upon obsolete information by requiring
that CRAs omit adverse information predating the report by more
than seven years. 47 An employer wary of liability for sexual
harassment, however, can not always disregard this information
during an investigation. EEOC guidelines indicate that the past
disciplinary record of an accused employee is important for an
employer to record and consider in a current investigation."* The
employer has another reason to consider past history of the alleged
harasser: to escape the imposition of large punitive damage awards. 149
Finally, there seems little question that the information contained in
an investigative report will be disputed by the accused harasser. The
FCRA, however, does not simply compel a CRA to omit disputed
information from a report. Rather, if an individual disputes
information in a consumer report, the CRA is obligated to
reinvestigate the information. 50 A reinvestigation, however, of the
investigation just completed is unlikely to be satisfactory to the
alleged harasser. Likevise, in the event that the reinvestigation by the
146. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that to be
actionable, harassment must be severe and pervasive such that the complainant found
the conduct to be subjectively harassing and a reasonable person similarly situated to
the complainant would also find the conduct offensive); see also supra Part I.A.
(discussing factors that determine employer liability for harassment).
147. See FCRA § 605(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1994); see also discussion supra at note
107 and accompanying text.
148. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 18, at N:4084 (indicating that an
employer should take into account a person's history of similar offensive behavior in
evaluating witness credibility and determining if harassment actually occurred).
149. See Note, Leading Cases: Civil Rights Acts, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 359, 359 (1999).
In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999), the Supreme Court
held that a court may award punitive damages against an employer for violations of
Title VII upon a showing by the plaintiff that the employer acted with malice or
reckless indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights. In Weeks v. Baker &
McKenzie, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (Ct. App. 1998), the defendant employer paid
punitive damages to the plaintiff because of prior unresolved complaints filed against
the harasser. Plaintiff introduced evidence of the alleged harasser's prior conduct, not
to show conformity with current conduct, but rather to show (1) intent on the part of
the alleged harasser, who having been reprimanded in the past, acted with a clear
regard that similar conduct would cause injury, and (2) that the employer was
negligent for failing to take appropriate corrective action. See id. at 532.
150. See supra note 109 (discussing CRA obligations in the event a consumer
disputes information).
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CRA does not resolve the dispute, the backup remedy under the
FCRA will also be unsatisfactory.151 The opportunity to annotate the
report with a 100-word statement with his or her version of the
allegedly harassing events will hardly satisfy the harasser nor resolve
the dispute. In a thorough investigation, the employer has already
interviewed the alleged harasser and the report already reflects his or
her version of the dispute.
As applied to sexual harassment investigations, the FCRA cannot
protect an individual from the use of inaccurate, obsolete, or disputed
information against him or her. The alleged harasser is not in a
position to review an investigative report for inaccuracies, the
employer is not in a position to ignore prior history, and the FCRA
procedure to resolve disputed information is inapplicable and
unsatisfactory. Applying the FCRA to an employer's investigation
conducted by an outside agency and allowing the alleged harasser
access to an unredacted copy of the investigative report will not
improve the accuracy or fairness of that report.
C. Employment Agreement Should Supersede FCRA Requirements
The FCRA provides an employer with an incentive to terminate the
employment of an employee accused of harassment upon receiving
the complaint. 5 ' The protection the FCRA purports to provide to an
employee is illusory if the employee is terminated. In the event of
termination pursuant to an at-will employment agreement on the basis
of a false or unsubstantiated harassment complaint, the employee's
only recourse against the employer are the common law wrongful
discharge claims.'53 If employment was pursuant to a modified at-will
agreement or for a term, the employee can also sue the employer for
breach of contract.154
The FCRA may supply important protection to a prospective
employee against the use of inaccurate, obsolete, or disputed
information that bears upon the employment decision. This
protection, however, should not extend after the employer hires the
individual, and that person becomes an employee. The FCRA is
inapplicable to the investigation of insurance claims, indicating that
151. See supra note 109 (discussing the consumer's ability to update the report with
his or her version of the disputed event or transaction).
152- See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
153. See supra Part I.A.4.
154. If an employee has a written employment contract for a term, the contract
may limit the ability of the employer to fire the employee. See Rothstein, supra note
51, § 8.2. At common law, an employee with a definite term contract may not be fired
before the expiration of that term except for cause or material breach, unless the
contract otherwise provides. See id. The requirement of cause provides an incentive
for an employer to conduct an investigation prior to firing an employee accused of
harassment. See id. This incentive works with, rather than against, the Title VII
incentive to investigate.
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perhaps Congress did not intend the FCRA to apply after the
establishment of a relationship between the subject of a report and the
person requesting the report.
The FCRA protects an individual who applies for insurance from
the use of inaccurate, obsolete, or disputed information in a consumer
report used to determine that individual's eligibility for insurance.155
The protections of the FCRA, however, do not apply after the
development of a contractual relationship between the insurance
company and the individual, specifically, when reports are prepared in
response to an insured's claim on a policy.'" For example, if a
consumer ("A") applies to an insurance company ("B") for insurance,
B may procure from a CRA a consumer report on A to determine A's
eligibility for insurance.' If B decides not to provide A insurance
based on the CRA's report, B must provide A with a copy of the
consumer report. 8 A then has the opportunity to review the report
for inaccuracies or otherwise disputed or obsolete information. The
FCRA prevents A from being denied insurance on the basis of
inaccurate, obsolete, or disputed information, and A may cause his
application to be reevaluated. However, if B were to extend A
insurance and A were to later make a claim against the policy, B may
use a CRA to investigate that claim and not be subject to FCRA
notice and disclosure requirements.' 59
Congress specifically excluded insurance claim reports from the
definition of consumer reports.160 The FTC has also confirmed that
CRA reports provided to insurers solely to assess the validity of a
claim are not consumer reports.' Moreover, courts have held,
consistent with statutory language and congressional intent, that a
155. See FCRA § 603(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (1994) (defining "consumer
report" as a report used "for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the
consumer's eligibility for... insurance .... ).
156. See Hovater v. Equifax, Inc., 823 F.2d 413, 419 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the FCRA does not apply when a report is issued by a CRA to an insurer to evaluate
an insured's claim for benefits under an existing policy).
157. The insurance company is obligated to provide the same notice and
authorization protection to the applicant, as discussed supra at notes 94-97 and
accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (discussing the report user's
disclosure obligations upon taking adverse action).
159. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
160. Three years after Congress enacted the FCRA, the original sponsor of the
Senate bill, Sen. William Proxmire, noted that insurance claim reports were not
covered by the FCRA and proposed an amendment to include them. See Cochran v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 827, 832 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (citing Hearings on
S.2360 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of the Senate Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Comm., 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1973)). This amendment was never
enacted, and CRA investigations of insurance claims remain unregulated by the
FCRA. See id. (citing Note, Judicial Construction of the Fair Credit Reporting Act:
Scope of Civil Liability, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 458,465, nn.44-47, 480 n.119 (1976)).
161. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, App. § 6(A).
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report prepared to investigate the validity of an insurance claim is not
within the scope of the FCRA.162
Congress does not explicitly state the reason for distinguishing
between reports used to determine eligibility for insurance and
reports used to evaluate subsequent claims. However, claim reports
are arguably outside of the FCRA's scope for two reasons. First,
claim investigation is part of an insurance company's ordinary course
of business and this type of investigation should neither come as a
surprise nor unduly prejudice an insured seeking to collect on a policy
claim. Second, the contractual relationship between the insurer and
insured imposes rights and responsibilities that the FCRA would only
duplicate or encumber. The insurance contract itself provides the
insured with protection from an insurance company that makes
arbitrary decisions with respect to coverage.
This distinction, between an insurance provider's initial insurance
decision and subsequent claim reports, should be applied in the
employment context. The FCRA should be limited to protecting only
prospective employees from the employer's use of inaccurate,
obsolete, or disputed information when making a hiring decision.
Once an employee is hired and an employment relationship is formed
between the parties, the FCRA should no longer apply. Rather, the
terms of the employment contract or the implied covenant of good
faith incumbent in an at-will employment agreement provide an
employee with adequate protection from arbitrary and unfair
employment decisions made with respect to promotion, reassignment,
and retention.
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICT
The FTC and Congress have recognized the dilemma presented to
an employer who attempts to comply with the FCRA and have
outside agencies investigate workplace harassment. 63 Two FCRA
162. See Hovater v. Equifax, Inc., 823 F.2d 413, 421 (11th Cir. 1987); Cochran, 472
F. Supp. at 831-32 (holding that a third-party investigation at the request of insurer
into the authenticity of plaintiffs insurance claim is not within the scope of the
FCRA); Soto v. Industrial Comm'n., 500 P.2d 313, 314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (holding
that a third-party investigation at the request of an employer into an employee's
workman compensation claim was not within the scope of the FCRA). But see Kiblen
v. Pickle, 653 P.2d 1338, 1342-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that insurance claims
reports are not consumer reports unless later used to deny claimant benefits); Beresh
v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 260,262 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (ignoring plain meaning of
the FCRA and holding that reports on insurance claims are covered by the statute
even if not within the definition of consumer report).
163. See FTC Testimony, supra note 133, at 3 ("The Commission fully appreciates
that practical problems may arise in applying all the FCRA requirements to
investigations by third parties of workplace misconduct."); H.R. 4373, 106th Cong.
(2000) (proposing to amend the FCRA to limit disclosure of report if obtained
pursuant to a workplace investigation); H.R. 3408, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing to
amend the FCRA to exempt certain investigative consumer reports from the Act).
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statutory amendments have been proposed in the House of
Representatives to alleviate this dilemma." H.R. 4373 is an
amendment suggested by the FTC that would provide employees
some of the FCRA consumer protections, yet allow an employer to
retain an outside agency to conduct workplace investigations. 5 The
amendment proposed by H.R. 3408 excludes entirely investigations by
outside agencies from FCRA requirements."6  These solutions,
however, fall short, either in their drafting or more important, their
conceptualization. It is the position advocated in this Note that the
FCRA does not, and was not meant to, apply to workplace
investigations in the first place, making an FCRA amendment
unnecessary except for the purpose of clarifying the Act's
inapplicability. If Congress does intend to extend some type of
statutory protection to an employee wrongfully accused of
harassment, similar to Title VII's proscription against retaliation with
respect to the complainant, it should do so outside of the confining
scope of the FCRA. In the alternative, in light of the fact that the
FTC has no rulemaking authority, 67 Congress should not further
amend the FCRA, but allow courts to interpret the language and
legislative intent of the Act so as not to apply in the context of
employee harassment investigations.
A. FTC Solutions and H.R. 4373
The FTC, in an unofficial letter opinion and in testimony at the
House Subcommittee Hearing on this issue on May 4, 2000, presented
several solutions to the dilemma created by its official interpretation
of the FCRA.11 These proposed solutions were born of the FTC's
desire to "strike a balance between the need to facilitate efficient,
timely investigations and the need to preserve the basic safeguards for
employees [provided by the FCRA]."'69
Initially, in an unofficial advisory opinion by FTC Associate
Director of the Division of Financial Practices, the agency proposed
two mitigating solutions that, in the opinion of that FTC staff
attorney, would allow an employer to comply with the FCRA and still
164. See H.R. 4373,106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 3408, 106th Cong. (1999).
165. See H.R. 4373,106th Cong. (2000); FTC Testimony, supra note 133, at 4.
166. See H.R. 3408, 106th Cong. (1999); FTC Testimony, supra note 133, at 3
(indicating that the effect of this proposed amendment is a "blanket exclusion" from
the FCRA).
167. See FCRA § 621(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (1994) (specifying that the FTC is
not permitted to issue rules or regulations with respect to the FCRA).
16& See Letter from David Medine, Associate Director, Division of Financial
Practices, Federal Trade Commission, to Susan R. Meisinger, Society for Human
Resource Management (Aug. 31, 1999) (visited Nov. 17, 1999)
<http:lwww.ftc.govloslstatutesl fcra/meisinger.htm> [hereinafter Medine Letter]; FTC
Testimony, supra note 133 passim.
169. FTC Testimony, supra note 133.
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hire outside agencies to conduct harassment investigations.1 0 In the
Medine Letter, the FTC suggested that an employer may get the
accused employee's consent to procure a report by "routinely
[obtaining consent] at the start of employment, thereby relieving the
employer of the awkward prospect of having to ask a suspected
wrongdoer for permission to allow a third party to provide an
investigative (or other) consumer report to the employer." ' This
proposal is an unsatisfactory solution. Should the FCRA be
applicable, procuring routine notice and consent from employees at
the start of employment, rather than at the start of an investigation,
arguably does not provide an employee with the degree of protection
Congress intended the FCRA to provide. Routine consent from the
employee at the start of employment, which allows an employer to
conduct an investigation at any time, is in effect a waiver of the
employee's FCRA rights to actual notice that an investigation is
underway. The FTC has said that despite the conflict between the
employer's obligations under the FCRA and Title VII, it is important
that FCRA protections extend to employees. 72 Yet, according to this
proposal, an employer may comply with the statutory safeguards of
the FCRA by requiring employees to waive FCRA rights of actual
notice at the start of an investigation.173
Moreover, routine notice and consent would not satisfy the FCRA
statutory requirements when a CRA prepares an investigative
consumer report containing interviews. The FCRA imposes
additional notice and disclosure obligations on employers who
procure and use investigative consumer reports.'7 4 The FTC does not
make clear in its opinion how blanket notice would satisfy these strict
requirements of additional disclosure.175 In fact, the Medine Letter
only indicates that "[e]mployers seeking to obtain reports on
employees can meet the disclosure requirements [for investigative
consumer reports] in a similar fashion [by routinely obtaining consent
at the start of employment]. ''176 Without actual notice that an
employer is in the process of procuring an investigative report, an
170. See Medine Letter, supra note 168. These two mitigating solutions were
presented in response to the perceived conflict created by the Keller Letter, supra
note 6, prior to the FTC's official adoption of the FCRA interpretation in the FTC
Letter, supra note 7.
171. Medine Letter, supra note 168.
172. See FTC Letter, supra note 7.
173. See Medine Letter, supra note 168.
174. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing FCRA notice and
disclosure requirements for investigative consumer reports). The FCRA requires the
employer, "upon written request made by the consumer within a reasonable period of
time after the receipt by him of the [notice that an investigative report will be
prepared], [to] make a complete and accurate disclosure of the nature and scope of the
investigation requested." FCRA § 606(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681d (1994) (emphasis added).
175. See Medine Letter, supra note 168.
176. Id.
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employee could not possibly request, within a reasonable period of
time, additional disclosure of the "nature and scope" of the
investigation.177
The second FTC initial proposed solution is equally unsatisfactory.
According to the FTC official FCRA interpretation, when an
employer takes adverse employment action against an employee on
the basis of a consumer report, the employer must first disclose the
report in full to the employee.178 The Medine Letter proposes that "an
investigative agency may draft its report to the employer to minimize
risks attendant to such disclosure, most importantly by not naming
parties that provide negative information regarding the employee."17 9
This is an unsatisfactory solution from the perspective of an employer
interested in conducting a prompt and thorough investigation in
preparation for the affirmative defense to vicarious liability for
workplace discrimination. A vague or incomplete report by a CRA
will decrease the value of the investigation and the effectiveness of the
employer's response to a harassment complaint. The plaintiff-
employee may challenge an incomplete or vague report as being the
product of a haphazard investigation. As one commentator noted,
"[e]mployers are second-guessed all the time about whether they
conduct a thorough sexual harassment investigation and one of the
elements that a good lawyer will go for is that they failed to get back-
up evidence for their conclusion. Cutting names and critical
information out of the report just opens you up to claims that the
investigation is incomplete.' 8 1
A more recent FTC-proposed solution does not refer to the
suggestions in the Medine Letter, but rather proposes a legislative
amendment, the form of which was introduced in the House of
Representatives as H.R. 4373, to clarify the applicability of the
FCRA.'1 The FTC proposed a new FCRA provision, § 626,
"applicable to investigations of alleged or suspected workplace
177. The purpose of additional disclosure for investigative consumer reports is to
allow an individual applicant for credit, insurance, or employment the "opportunity to
decide whether credit, insurance, or other benefits are sufficiently important to
sacrifice his privacy." Fair Credit Note, supra note 6, at 834. If the individual does not
want his privacy invaded by the interviews conducted in preparation of an
investigative consumer report, "he can withdraw his application and there will be no
investigation." Id. This reasoning does not apply when the employer is obliged to do
an investigation, whether alone or with the aid of a third-party, regardless of the
individual's desire not to be investigated, as is the case for sexual harassment
investigations. See id. at 834 n.91.
17M See discussion on disclosure requirements supra at notes 101-104 and
accompanying text.
179. Medine Letter, supra note 168 (citation omitted).
180. See Eli Research, Sexual Harassment: FTC Sticks to its Guns on FCRA's
Application to Harassment Inquiries, Hosp. Personnel Mgmt., Oct. 1999, at 41,42.
181. Id. (quoting Rod Satterwhite).
182 See FTC Testimony, supra note 133, at 4.
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illegality, which would provide that, in cases in which a consumer
report is obtained for the purpose of investigating suspected or
alleged illegal misconduct by an employee, compliance with [certain
FCRA sections] is not required."1" The FTC would exempt
employers from having to (1) provide notice to employees, 114 (2) get
the accused employee's authorization to proceed,185 (3) disclosing the
report to the employee upon adverse action,8 6 and (4) comply with
additional safeguards applicable for the use of the investigative
consumer report.18
The FTC approach leaves in place every other FCRA relevant
requirement, such as the CRA's obligation to follow reasonable
procedures and employ accuracy safeguards,lm as well as the
employer's obligation, in the case of adverse action, to provide to the
employee "the name and other identifying information about the
[CRA], and notification of the [employee's] right to obtain a
disclosure of the [report's nature and substance]."' 9 In the case of an
investigative consumer report, this disclosure would be "a summary of
the 'nature and substance' of the report," and would allow the
employee "to obtain a degree of meaningful, genuine disclosure of the
information that served as the basis for the adverse decision."'19
Moreover, the employer would not be obligated to comply with this
remaining applicable FCRA provision until after taking adverse
action, thus allowing the employer to take prompt remedial action if
necessary. 191
H.R. 4373 eliminates the conflict created by the FTC official
interpretation by amending the FCRA to exempt employers from
most substantive FCRA requirements. It does not address the fact
that an employer, in many instances, might immediately terminate any
employee upon the receipt of the complaint, and then not be
responsible for even providing the terminated employee with the
name of the outside agency that prepared the report.
This amendment allows an employer to proceed with the retention
of outside agencies to conduct investigations into sexual harassment
allegations. It does so, however, by exempting employers from all
substantive provisions of the FCRA, and making inapplicable all the
183. Id. H.R. 4373 does not incorporate the proposed amendment as a new section
in the FCRA, but the intended effect of the amendment is the same as the FTC
proposed.
184. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for notice requirement.
185. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text for authorization requirement.
186. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text for disclosure requirement.
187. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text for additional safeguards for
use of investigative consumer reports.
188. See discussion supra at notes 105-108.
189. FTC Testimony, supra note 133, at 5 (referring to FCRA §§ 615 and 609(a)(1),
still applicable to an employer and CRA under their legislative proposal).
190. Id. at n.19.
191. See id. at 5.
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consumer protections the FTC believed to be important enough to
raise this dilemma in the first place. H.R. 4373 further complicates the
FCRA and fosters a piecemeal approach to protecting an employee
wrongfully accused of sexual harassment.
B. H.R. 3408 and Complete Exclusion from FCRA Requirements
H.R. 3408, introduced in November, 1999, is an FCRA amendment
that would exclude from the definition of "consumer report"'9 all
CRA reports on illegal workplace conduct and any other reports
prepared in connection with, or in anticipation of, litigation.193 In
effect, this amendment creates a blanket exemption from the FCRA
for these investigations.19 The bill also requires modified disclosure
when an employer takes adverse action against an employee on the
basis of a CRA report, requiring the employer to tell the employee
the "nature and substance" of the report."9
This bill would seem to resolve the apparent conflict between the
FCRA and Title VII investigations by making the FCRA wholly
inapplicable to harassment investigations.'9 The blanket exclusion,
however, conflicts with the provision that would purport to require
disclosure in some instances.197 As the FTC has noticed, it is unclear
how this disclosure provision would be enforced given that the
amendment wholly excludes these reports from the FCRA, and such
reports would not be subject to the FCRA, as amended.'"
The FTC further criticized the approach taken by H.R. 3408
because it would "eliminate a significant number of long-standing
privacy and procedural protections that the FCRA traditionally has
afforded to employees that are the target of such investigations."19
This concern is ironic considering that the FTC's own proposal and
H.R. 4373 would exclude these investigations from all the same
substantive notice and disclosure requirements.m By making the
FCRA inapplicable, this bill eliminates an employer's incentive to
terminate immediately an employee to avoid FCRA liability. Should
Congress choose to provide statutory protection, similar to the
protection of the FCRA or Title VII's prohibition of retaliation, to
192. FCRA § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (1994); see discussion on this definition
supra at notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
193. See H.R. 3408, 106th Cong. (1999).
194. See 145 Cong. Rec. E2421-02 (statement of Hon. Sessions).
195. See H.R. 3408, 106th Cong. (1999).
196. See FTC Testimony, supra note 133.
197. See H.R. 3408, 106th Cong. (1999). The way the bill is drafted, the modified
disclosure requirement is only implicated when a CRA prepares a report in
connection with an investigation into illegal conduct, but not when the report is
prepared in connection with, or in anticipation of, litigation. See id.
198. See FTC Testimony, supra note 133, at n.18.
199. Id at 3.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 184-87.
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employees accused of harassment or terminated based on a false or
unsubstantiated complaint, it should do so outside the cumbersome
confines of the Act.
C. Judicial Interpretation
Even without a congressional amendment, the FCRA's language,
supplemented by evidence of legislative intent, allows a court to
resolve the conflict by interpreting the FCRA as excluding an outside
agency investigation and resultant report.20 1 Many, if not most,
outside agencies will not meet the definition of CRA because they do
not "regularly engage[] in whole or in part in the practice of
assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other
information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports [to employers]. '' 21 Rather, these agencies provide legal advice
in response to legal issues.203 The resultant report and "[it's] impact
on individual employees is a by-product of their specialized advice. ' 2°
Moreover, outside agencies, arguably, do not prepare "consumer
reports" as defined by the FCRA,20 5 because the employer requests
the report, not to investigate the employee's credit worthiness,
character or reputation, but rather to determine and reduce potential
employer liability for sexual harassment.2 °
Courts, when faced with a conflict between the FCRA and Title
VII, should construe the FCRA definitional requirements narrowly so
as not to discourage an employer's use of independent investigators.
A broad reading may lead to a result inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's opinions in Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth20, and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.20 8
CONCLUSION
The FTC's very broad interpretation of the FCRA may support
their opinion that workplace harassment investigations, conducted by
outside agencies at an employer's request, are within the scope of the
Act. These investigations, however, are not within the spirit of the
statute, nor consistent with its purpose. The FCRA would frustrate an
201. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
202. FCRA § 603(0, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (1994); see Hearing on the Fair Credit
Reporting Act Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit (May 4, 2000)
(written testimony of Mark S. Dichter) available at
http://www.house.gov/banking/5400dic.htm [hereinafter Mark S. Dichter Testimony].
203. See supra Part II.A.
204. Mark S. Dichter Testimony, supra note 202.
205. FCRA § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (1994); see supra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text.
206. See supra Part II.A.
207. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
208. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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employer's ability to prevent and correct workplace discrimination in
violation of Title VII.
The two FCRA amendments currently proposed in the House of
Representatives exempt workplace investigations and resultant
reports from most of the Act's substantive notice and disclosure
requirements, but still require employers and CRAs to comply with
some lesser protections. The few consumer protections the
amendments would require of employers are not sufficiently tailored
to the context of workplace harassment investigations. The effect of
either amendment would be to foster a piecemeal attempt of
providing statutory protection for an employee terminated or
demoted on the basis of a false or unsubstantiated harassment
complaint against him or her.
A better solution would be for Congress to exclude from the FCRA
all employer investigations that involve, as subjects or witnesses, any
employee currently employed by the employer. In the employment
context, the FCRA should be limited to protecting only prospective
employees from the employer's use of inaccurate, disputed, or
obsolete information when making a hiring decision. If Congress does
wish to extend some type of statutory protection to an employee
wrongfully terminated or demoted, it should do so outside the
confines of the Act.
Notes & Observations
